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An Uncertain Future:  
Youth Frustration and the Arab Spring 
M. Chloe Mulderig 
Abstract
Many scholars have focused on the political factors (in particular, the desire for 
regime change and democratization) as central motivations for the Arab Spring 
revolutions of 2011. However, the Arab world is currently experiencing massive 
demographic crises, and policy makers must acknowledge the cultural pressures 
that have left this young generation trapped in a pre-adulthood phase of social 
status that prevents them from becoming fully engaged with Arab society. The 
inability of youth to access the opportunities promised in the social contract of 
adulthood—including quality education, viable employment, and marriage and 
family formation—has led to massive resentment motivating youth to actively seek 
change within their country and region. Countries which do not begin to address 
the cultural sources of youth frustration will find themselves vulnerable to continued 
unrest long after the Arab Spring dissipates, while the current youth generation 
runs the risk of becoming socially displaced in a region experiencing rapid economic 
and cultural development.
* The author would like to thank Professor James McCann and the staff and Research Fellows at the Pardee 
Center, Boston University for their valuable contributions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
Additional financial support for fieldwork contributing to this article was provided by the Boston Univer-
sity Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Boston University Department of Anthropology, the Institute 
of International Education, and the Mellon Foundation. The views expressed herein are solely those of 
the author and may not necessarily reflect the views of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the 
Longer-Range Future or Boston University. The author takes responsibility for any errors.
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Mohammed Bouazizi, the young street vendor who set himself ablaze in 
public in late 2010, did not intend to start a revolution in Tunisia. He 
certainly could not have foreseen that he would motivate the peoples of 
the Arab world1 to seek social change in the collection of demonstrations, 
rebellions, and armed conflicts stretching from Morocco to the Gulf that 
the international community has dubbed the “Arab Spring.” Bouazizi’s 
actions resonated around the world precisely because Bouazizi personified 
a huge segment of the population that would become the force behind the 
demonstrations of the Arab Spring: young, single, un- or under-employed, 
desperate, and increasingly enraged at their governments for ignoring these 
problems. Bouazizi did not inspire the Arab Spring because he was special; 
he inspired demonstrations because his situation was not unique at all.
While revolutions are most often 
viewed as rebellion against a 
specific political regime, youth 
participation in the Arab Spring 
should be examined as an expres-
sion of a powerful socio-cultural 
frustration: the inability of youth 
to achieve adulthood, held back 
by governments and markets 
that stall youth engagement. 
Throughout the West, the Arab Spring has been portrayed as a struggle 
between the masses seeking democratic reform and stagnant regimes looking 
to perpetuate authoritarianism. However, “the vast majority of protestors 
knew nothing of political ideology. They were brought into the streets, not 
by a burning desire for free and fair elections, but by the dire economic cir-
cumstances in which they lived” (Bradley 2012:201). Arab Spring demon-
strations were an opportunity for citizens to demand the fulfillment of the 
social contracts made with their autocratic leaders, and should be viewed as 
not only a political struggle, but also an economic and cultural struggle. The 
most basic of societal contracts—that children will one day grow up, begin 
1. For the purposes of this paper, the “Arab world” consists of the nations of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen, as well as the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza.
The most basic of societal contracts—
that children will one day grow up, 
begin to contribute productively to 
society, and then raise families of 
their own—has been broken for an 
entire generation of youth in the Arab 
world trapped in a liminal period often 
referred to as “waithood.”
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to contribute productively to society, and then raise families of their own—
has been broken for an entire generation of youth in the Arab world trapped 
in a liminal period often referred to as “waithood.” In this anthropologi-
cal study, based on ethnographic fieldwork and on-the-ground research in 
Morocco throughout 2011 and 2012, I argue that the socio-cultural motiva-
tions and frustrations expressed by Arab youth were the underlying cause of 
the regional unrest, and these social and economic problems will remain a 
hindrance to legitimate democratic reform unless they are addressed.
The Arab Spring has been notable because of the wide variety of partici-
pants found in each country; still, the most common face seen at demon-
strations was that of the young Arab, aged 15–24. Certainly, members of 
the middle-class and the economic elite participated in the demonstrations, 
and Arabs of all age-levels fought for their dignity in the face of autocratic 
repression. Once military or police forces were used to suppress protestors, 
there is no doubt that many more joined protests to fight for stability and 
safety in their cities; after all, liberation and revolution are on-going pro-
cesses. And while this study proposes that the overarching socio-cultural, 
economic, and political problems causing youth frustration can be found 
throughout the Arab world, it claims neither that the situation on the 
ground is the same in any two countries, nor that youth were the only par-
ticipants or their concerns the only relevant demands. 
Ultimately, however, I argue that the contagion of the Arab Spring revolu-
tions was largely caused by the realization of youth in Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
and elsewhere that their generation was living in an undignified liminal state 
of pre-adulthood, and that the possibility of demanding access to educa-
tion, jobs, and marriage was open to all Arab youth. In addition, as the Arab 
Spring melted away in a summer of discontent, blood, and uncertainty, the 
deeply entrenched socio-economic problems that caused Arab youth frustra-
tion did not simply disappear with the overthrow of a given dictator. The 
success of various states in the region in the longer-term future will depend 
on a coherent strategy to improve education, promote the private sector and 
increase employment opportunities, and assist young Arabs in affording 
the marriages necessary for youth to embrace adult social status in the Arab 
world. The survival of any democratic government spawned by the Arab 
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Spring will require the participation of youth, as well as policies and pro-
grams that address the concerns of youth in both the short- and long-term.
THE INITIAL TRAPS:  
THE YOUTH BULGE AND ARAB UNEMPLOYMENT
The Arab world has been facing a demographic trap for nearly three decades, 
and the worst generational demographic imbalances are, for many Arab 
countries, yet to come. The vast majority of population growth in the Arab 
world was caused by high birth rates and prolonged life spans, as opposed to 
any kind of immigration into the region. The resulting cadre of youth are liv-
ing longer, healthier lives and are seeking a higher quality of living, including 
accountability from their governments, more consumer options, and respect 
for human rights. The Arab Spring could not have occurred without the ideo-
logical and numerical push of a huge mass of angry youth.
These demographic transitions have led to unbalanced societies in terms of 
age cohorts, and by 2011 many of these young cohorts had “come of age” and 
were seeking the benefits of adulthood. Youth under the age of 24 account for 
just over half of the population of the Arab world.2 The cohort that is now 
coming of age across the Arab world, ages 15–24, accounts for roughly 20 
percent of the regional population (Middle East Youth Initiative 2009; U.S. 
Census Bureau 2011). One out of every five Arabs is seeking to finish school-
ing, find a job, and get married, while another 30 percent of the population 
are children, and will want their opportunities when their times come.
Thus, when governments strive to improve educational access to all, they 
are not only looking to increase opportunities for women and those in 
rural areas, but these governments also need to create more openings 
at schools in absolute terms. The same applies for the job market. In 
the Arab world in particular, where the education and job markets have 
only recently embraced participation by women, the absolute increase in 
opportunities needed is staggering. The end of this youth bulge trend, for 
2. All demographic information used in this report was collected by national and international organiza-
tions before the beginning of the Arab Spring. New demographic information, which takes into account 
deaths and emigration due to violence in 2011–2012, was not available at time of publication. It is likely 
that Syria and Libya in particular will have smaller youth bulges after the Arab Spring due to civil war 
and regime suppression.
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most states of the Arab world, will not occur until 2030 or, for states like 
Iraq, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen that are further delayed in their 
youth bulges, 2050 (World Bank/IBRD 2008:98). Even when states reach 
100 percent gross enrollment rate in primary and secondary schooling, 
as most are striving for, they will need to continue increasing educational 
funding as the absolute number of youth continues to rise for the next 
half century. Years after the Arab Spring has become a memory, the Arab 
world will still face the central challenge causing unrest and dissatisfac-
tion: a massive youth, seeking to find its place in society and its own sense 
of identity. For most youth of the world, identity formation begins with 
the family, schooling, and the first job, when necessary skills and ideas are 
imparted to the next generation. 
Arab and Jobless
Unemployment and underemployment are also debilitating problems in the 
Arab world. According to the ILO Global Employment Trends 2011 Report, 
the Middle East and North Africa are the two regions with the worst rates of 
unemployment in 2010, especially 
amongst youth (ILO 2011a:48). 
At 10.3 percent in 2010, the 
unemployment rate in the Arab 
world has been the highest of any 
region on the globe for many years 
(ILO 2011a). There is also massive disparity in unemployment rates within 
the Arab world, with Yemen suffering from 35 percent unemployment while 
Qatar only experiences half a percent unemployment. 
Youth unemployment in the Arab world is consistently higher than youth 
unemployment rates of other regions. Youth unemployment in the region 
ranges from Yemen on the high end with 50 percent youth unemploy-
ment, to the United Arab Emirates at the low end with 12.1 percent; in 
all cases, the percentage of Arab youth willing but unable to find work 
is significantly higher than anywhere else in the world. According to the 
United Nations Development Program and the League of Arab States, 
nations of the Arab world collectively will need to create roughly 51 mil-
lion jobs by 2020 to meet demand for jobs for the currently unemployed 
Youth unemployment in the Arab 
world is consistently higher than youth 
unemployment rates of other regions.
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and the youth who will be entering the job market soon (Abdel-Gadir and 
Abu-Ismail 2009:32–33; UNDP 2009:109). 
In addition, the Arab world suffers from low participation rates, meaning 
that fewer members of society who could be working actually are working.  
The employment-to-population ratio of the Arab world is roughly 45 
percent, so that more Arabs of productive age are not in the work force 
than are in the work force (Abdih 2011). Across the Arab world, this low 
participation rate means that many, including youth, are choosing to avoid 
employment all together, living with the support of family or remittances 
from abroad. Many others choose to be underemployed or work “off-the-
books” in the gray-market economy. In the Arab world in particular, this 
low participation rate is further skewed by gender, with less than 30 percent 
of working age women participating in the job market (ILO 2011a:52). 
Rates of Arab female engagement within the work force are the lowest in the 
world. All discussions of unemployment, and especially youth unemploy-
ment, should be viewed through the lens of work force participation—  
unemployment rates only track those who are willingly looking for employ-
ment but cannot find it, and do not include the half of the Arab population, 
and the two-thirds of the female population, who have given up seeking 
employment or never sought work at all. 
One of the main causes of unemployment and underemployment in the 
Arab world has been the poor application of neo-liberal economic policies 
by Arab regimes incapable of or disinterested in building strong economies. 
This included a decrease of the role that public sector employment would 
play in the economy of a state and a general shrinking of the governmental 
bureaucracy with the goal of elevating the private sector. In the Arab world, 
however, these policies have more accurately led to unprecedented crony-
ism, a decrease in the number of public sector jobs and a growing mistrust of 
the private sector that has not grown to replace lost governmental jobs (e4e 
2011). This has led to increases in unemployment, but not to a correspond-
ing rejection of public sector jobs, which are still too highly prized amongst 
Arab workers. Public sector jobs still offer more money, security, and 
benefits, even if they are harder to find (Kabbani 2009). For example, many 
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of my informants3 in Morocco stress the importance of public sector jobs 
in inserting the worker into the governmental “club,” allowing nepotistic 
benefits like lower property taxes and faster processing of passport requests. 
Thus, many Arabs, young and old, prioritize public sector jobs even when 
they are non-existent or unavailable, which leads many to wait rather than 
take private sector employment, with the hopes that a public sector job will 
materialize in the future.
Unemployment is a result of a failure of the job market to offer sufficient 
numbers of jobs in multiple sectors, as well as a failure of the state to 
provide the education and training necessary to succeed in a wide variety 
of industries and fields. In most parts of the world, the first step toward a 
secure career is quality education. The pivotal social sphere of education is 
the first place that Arab governments fail their youth in assisting the transi-
tion to adulthood, and the failure of Arab education sets the stage for an 
entrapment in a liminal pre-adulthood existence.
A FAILING MARK FOR ARAB EDUCATION
With the threat of youth bulges looming on the horizon, many Arab states 
launched massive educational reforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
that significantly increased participation in educational programs, improved 
access to education for the rural, poor and other vulnerable segments of the 
population, closed the gender gap in relation to enrollment and graduation, 
and reduced illiteracy (UNDP 2002:52). Increasing investment by Arab 
governments has lead to education accounting for more than five percent of 
GDP in all Arab countries (except Syria) which have seen popular revolu-
tion, public demonstrations, or political unrest (UNESCO/EFA 2009). 
Many countries in the Arab world are allocating more than 15 percent of 
their government spending on educational programs (World Bank/IBRD 
2008:104). Primary education is slowly becoming more common in the 
region, and those in rural areas in particular have seen a marked increase 
in access to adolescent schooling and post-secondary education. Illiteracy 
3. Although the term “informant” has specific connotations in the intelligence field, it is used in this 
paper solely in the anthropological context to refer impartially to subjects interviewed and studied dur-
ing ethnographic research.
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rates have dropped significantly within the last generation (Rugh 2002). 
The international community has applauded the Arab world for its rapid 
improvement in women’s access to education, though the gender gap is 
not closed yet. Arab educational systems, much like their other developing 
world counterparts, have been struggling with high dropout and repeti-
tion rates (UNESCO/EFA 2005), but states have been actively working to 
reduce these rates, particularly in cases where rates are the highest among 
the rural and lower-class. 
Still, the international community has perhaps been too quick to applaud 
the Arab world for its rapid improvements in educational access: Morocco 
still boasts nearly 40 percent illiteracy, while in Jordan and many other states 
secondary education has become the almost exclusive realm of middle and 
upper-class youth (Dhillon, Dyer and Yousef 2010). Accountability is a cen-
tral and largely unaddressed concern (UNDP 2002; UNESCO/EFA 2005). 
Tears of frustration streaming down her face, one young Moroccan I spoke 
with provided a clear analysis of her educational experience: “Education in 
Morocco is worth zero. I know that, all my classmates know that. Even our 
parents know. But what are we to do?” While nearly all Arab youth have 
access to at least the beginnings of a full education, the actual value of what 
they are receiving has not yet reached international expectations. 
When Arab youth are tested on skills and knowledge gained during their 
education, the progress of education in the Arab world is revealed to be a 
mirage. Students in the Arab world score significantly lower on international 
standardized educational testing, meaning that the average Arab student has 
gained less from their time in schooling than youth in other countries. Arab 
students from Morocco to the Gulf score lower than average in both math 
and science on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS), with many countries’ median student scoring at or below the low 
benchmark and none scoring at the international average (Dhillon, Dyer 
and Yousef 2010:19; Institute of Education Sciences 2011). According to 
the 2005 Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey, only 49.7 percent of 
girls graduating from the state-required minimum years of schooling (aged 
15 or older) could pass a basic literacy test (Assaad and Barsoum 2007). The 
World Bank argued in 2008 that this startling gap between the improve-
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ment in the quantity of education in the Arab world, without a correspond-
ing improvement in the quality of education, has lead to stalled economic 
growth in much of the region (World Bank/IBRD 2008). Arab students do 
not have the ability to compete on an international level, and also lack the 
basic mathematical and communications skills needed to work in almost 
any non-menial-labor position available (UNDP 2002).
In addition to poor performance on international standardized testing, 
many youth in the Arab world are experiencing a skills mismatch that has 
exacerbated unemployment stresses. Education in much of the Arab world 
still focuses on the rote memorization techniques honed during centuries 
of Qur’anic madrasa education. Numerous anthropologists and other social 
scientists working in the Arab world today observe pedagogical problems 
in Arab classrooms: students spend hours copying numbers and words off 
of blackboards, with eyes buried in textbooks or focused on a sole teacher 
addressing the entire class in oral repetitions of lists of facts (Brown 2003; 
Rugh 2002; Watkins 2011; World Bank/IBRD 2008). Creative or original 
activities, group work, debate, and expression of opinion are rare. The needs 
of individual students are almost completely ignored.
Social Confusion about Skills Needed 
There is still a strong societal belief across the Arab world that the best quality 
employment requires a university degree, and many families push children 
into university programs even if students failed to obtain basic problem-
solving and independent-thinking skills. This is because “access to univer-
sities . . . is highly dependent on passing national tests which are designed 
primarily to measure the acquisition of facts and knowledge through rote 
memorization rather than 
critical and independent 
thinking” (Dhillon and 
Salehi-Isfahani 2008:6). The 
Education for Employment 
Initiative found that, even 
while businesses are look-
ing for workers with problem-solving and other skills, youth still incorrectly 
believe that the rote memorization of language and computer skills are most 
Universities must reorient their enroll-
ment requirements to encourage the 
teaching of critical-thinking skills as 
opposed to the regurgitation of facts 
gained through rote memorization.
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important in finding a new job (e4e 2011; see also Rugh 2002). Universities 
must reorient their enrollment requirements to encourage the teaching of 
critical-thinking skills as opposed to the regurgitation of facts gained through 
rote memorization.
Students are choosing to major in the fields of the humanities and social sci-
ences during higher education, the disciplines most favored by public sector 
employment but also most overpopulated (Al Masah Research 2011; World 
Bank/IBRD 2008). Many states, including Egypt and Morocco, limit the 
number of students focusing on scientific, technical, and engineering stud-
ies, crippling the next generations’ ability to pursue emerging industries like 
information technology, biomedical technology, and various new fields of 
engineering. It should be noted with sad irony that the only two countries 
in the Arab world that can boast over 10 percent of their students obtain-
ing degrees in medicine and medical sciences are Libya and Syria, with 17 
percent and 11.5 percent respectively (World Bank/IBRD 2008:21). These 
will also be the two countries that will most desperately need a new genera-
tion of doctors to cope with the massive civilian casualties each nation faced 
in their Arab Spring.
Highly Educated and Unemployable 
The combination of an overemphasis on public sector employment and 
a dramatic skills mismatch puts the Arab world in a unique conundrum: 
the more education one has in the Arab world, the less likely he or she is to 
secure employment. In Morocco, for example, the unemployment rate for 
youths age 15–24 in 2004 was 7.7 percent for workers without a diploma, 
28.1 percent for those with a baccalaureate (secondary school degree), and 
61.2 percent for those with a university diploma or better (Boudarbat and 
Ajbilou 2007). In Jordan, where education has been the pet project of Her 
Majesty Queen Rania al Abdullah, 53 percent of unemployed youth have 
a university degree or better (ETF 2005). There is thus massive frustration 
because youth receive the same general message in the Arab world as they  
do around the globe: if you get more education, you will have more oppor-
tunity, and you will get a better job. But for many Arab youth, that message 
is a blatant lie. 
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Creating a cohort of over-educated and unemployed youth in the Arab 
world has led to the formation of unions, which can present a real threat 
to regime security. In Morocco, I attended a number of demonstrations 
organized by the Association National des Diplomés Chômeurs, a union 
of university-degree-holding unemployed youth that have been active for 
over a decade. This union became one of the major pools of support for the 
troubled “20 February” movement, Morocco’s only real source of discontent 
during the Arab Spring. The group is particularly well-known for appearing 
at government demonstrations brandishing their university diplomas and 
waving them angrily at government officials who attempt to quell the pro-
test. Similar groups exist elsewhere in the Arab world, and are particularly 
active in Egypt and Tunisia.
If educational systems in the Arab world train students to barely pass exams 
oriented toward public sector work, even as public sector jobs are disap-
pearing, then what role does the private sector have in bridging the gap 
between education and youth employment? The answer is unclear. The 
2010/2011 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey found that more 
than half of the youth in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states4 would 
prefer to work in the public sector, but in the non-GCC countries of the 
Arab world, nearly two-thirds of youth are more interested in private sector 
employment, a sign that opinions may be changing and youth are becoming 
increasingly interested in private sector opportunities (ASDA’A Burson-
Marsteller 2011). Internationally, governments from Morocco to the Gulf 
(as with elsewhere in the developing world) have been actively encouraging 
private sector investment and the growth of private sector employment in 
their respective countries for decades. But neo-liberal economic policies, 
along with a history of Arab Socialism, have made many in the Arab world 
suspicious of the private sector, corporations, and Western-backed transna-
tional companies. The resulting state policies that regulate employment in 
the private sector are harsh and heavily discourage discretionary layoffs. This 
in turn discourages the private sector from hiring new workers and prevents 
4. The reader is reminded that the GCC did not yet include the non-Gulf countries of Morocco or 
Jordan at the time of the 2010/2011 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. The invitation of 
Morocco and Jordan to the GCC was an Arab Spring development that, while relevant to analysis of the 
events of 2011, is not pertinent to the focus of this report.
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the private sector from rewarding workers based on skills or output (Abdih 
2011; World Bank/IBRD 2008). Until these labor laws are revised, and 
private sector businesses are able to hire and fire based on skills and per-
formance, the private sector will remain feeble in the Arab world and leave 
youth with few employment opportunities. 
As a result, many youth in the Arab world are finding employment in the 
informal sector or black market, which often has both short- and longer-
term consequences. Jobs in the informal sector are often seasonal or short-
term, and provide little in terms of marketable skills that can be leveraged 
when looking for better employment. These positions rarely include 
contracts and allow little to no legal recourse for employees, a particularly 
dangerous situation for young female workers. In addition to instabil-
ity, informal sector jobs are often less enjoyable and provide little worker 
satisfaction, a major factor affecting youth frustration in the Arab world for 
which there is yet little data collected (Assaad, Binzel and Gadallah 2010). 
Exacerbating these realities, most youth who get their first job in the infor-
mal sector have little chance of leaving the informal sector for later employ-
ment; in Egypt, for example, only 11 percent of those whose first job is in 
the informal sector are subsequently able to find employment in the formal 
sector (Assaad, Binzel and Gadallah 2010).
The result is a failure of education in the eyes of the youth for whom 
numerous “opportunities” for more schooling have not equaled opportuni-
ties for employment. For many, the objective of education is to gain the 
skills and expertise necessary to secure long-term employment. The end 
result is a feeling that one has “put in his time” and is entitled to, at the 
least, a better shot at getting a preferred job; when this contract is broken, 
the individual feels he has “studied for no reason” and wasted time in pro-
gressing toward financial security. The “silver bullet” of education becomes 
a bitter pill to swallow when youth are more likely to secure employment 
if they do not pursue secondary education, even as governments, eager for 
international financial support, encourage youth to enroll and graduate. The 
implications of this frustration are obvious; as Brookings Institute analysts 
noted, “these revolutions were not propagated by well-educated youth; 
these uprisings were spurred by the needs and demands of poorly educated 
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youth, whose knowledge and skills do not meet the demands of a rapidly-
advancing world” (Adams and Winthrop 2011). Thus, while the myth of 
the well-educated youth gained popularity throughout the West during 
news coverage of Egypt’s revolution and other Arab Spring demonstrations, 
this picture was not quite accurate: Arab youth are over-educated, not well-
educated, and their stalled status reminds them of this difference daily.
For millions of youth across the Arab world, years of schooling have failed to 
provide economic opportunities. Even those able to find work in the informal 
sector are struggling to make enough money to afford the basics of life, espe-
cially since the 2008 global recession has increased the price of food, cooking 
oil, fuel, and other necessities. But many youth are not only looking for work 
to earn a living wage; they must also begin saving money for the future. Young 
men in particular are pressured to save up significant sums of money, because 
they will need to finance the next step of the transition out of the pre-adult-
hood phase: marriage and the formation of a new family.
THE FAILURE OF FAMILY FORMATION
Missing Out on Marriage 
Why is marriage such a pivotal concern for youth within the Arab world? 
Delaying marriage in the Islamic Arab world has a physical frustration 
attached: because sexual intercourse before marriage or outside of marriage 
is considered forbidden, delaying marriage can also delay the seeking of 
sexual gratification, resulting in frustration caused by the “increasing gap 
between sexual maturity, beginning at puberty, and social maturity, the 
age at which it is socially responsible to get married” (Ali 2006:58). Extra-
marital intercourse, known as zina, is prohibited in the Qur’an and the 
hadith, and centuries of Islamic jurisprudence has emphasized the value 
of virginity before marriage for both sexes (though more so for women). 
Neither Islam, nor Arab culture, is unique in this perspective. But in the 
Islamic world, pre-marital and especially feminine virginity is emphasized in 
popular discourse and Islamist politics alike, and changing sexual norms are 
some of the most controversial topics within the Islamic world today. The 
public debate is, in part, because of changes in dress—particularly the emer-
gence of the muhajababe (Stratton 2006), the hijab-wearing young Muslim 
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woman in tight or revealing Western fashions—and changes in the public 
mixing between genders at universities and the workplace.
Debate regarding marriage and sexuality is also heated because, in the Arab 
world, marriage is not only a contract between two individuals; it is a social 
contract with society that those individuals will build a family unit and 
contribute to the next genera-
tion. As anthropologist Diane 
Singerman points out, “it is only 
through marriage that adolescents 
gain adult status due to social, 
cultural, and religious norms, 
yet young people marry at a later 
age in the Middle East (31 years 
of age for men, 23 for women) 
than anywhere else in the globe except for China, and early marriage among 
young women has fallen more dramatically than anywhere else in the globe” 
(2008:76). If marriage is the end of the adolescent liminal phase, then 
delay of marriage is not only a delay in starting a family, but also a delay 
in obtaining social acceptance and fulfillment of the socio-religious adult 
role for the individual. Thus, for most youth in the Arab world, marriage 
and raising a family are non-negotiable goals on the life course. Few choose 
not to marry, and prolonged “singlehood” is usually viewed by Arab society 
with either distrust or pity. Overwhelmingly, the motivation for delaying or 
rejecting marriage is financial, creating a situation in which youth desir-
ing to marry simply have to wait until they (and their families) have saved 
enough money to afford a wedding (Rashad et. al. 2005; Singerman 2008).
Marriage does not come cheap in the Arab world. Singerman (2007), who 
has thoroughly explored the intersection of the economic and cultural costs 
and benefits of marriage in the Arab world, determined that the average cost 
of marriage in Egypt in 1999 was LE 20,194 (USD $6,000); this equaled 
more than four and a half times GNP per capita in 1999 and eleven times 
the annual household expenditure. By 2005, that cost had risen to over LE 
32,000, according to the 2006 Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey (Sing-
erman 2007). In Saudi Arabia, marriage costs in 2003 were estimated to be 
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roughly SR165,000 (USD $43,000), with just over 21 percent of that cost 
going toward the lavish and social-status-oriented celebrations and recep-
tions (Qusti 2003). 
The hidden expense of dowry compounds this rise in marriage costs. In 
the Arab world, a dowry passes from groom to bride, and if he initiates 
a divorce, she will be able to keep the dowry as payment. The dowry is a 
particularly complex cost, as it is a marker of social relations. When families 
married their youth to cousins, trusted members of the tribe or neighbor-
hood, or family friends through horizontal associations, these marriages 
were backed with the social reassurances that both sides would help the 
young couple work through their problems and lead a successful marriage. 
Marriage was a social contract that unified groups and families, and thus 
was unlikely to end in divorce. But as the nature of marriage changes, and 
more youth marry out of love and desire, there has been an increase in 
divorce rates and dowry has become a major deterrent for divorce. 
The result has been skyrocketing dowry costs. For example, in Yemen, dowry 
costs have risen from USD $200 to upwards of USD $20,000 within the 
last generation (Almasmari 2006). One of my favorite informants, a young 
Moroccan man named Saleh, was finally able in the spring of 2012 to marry 
a neighbor he had loved since childhood. Making less than USD $25 a week 
and saving for almost a decade, he was only able to afford the USD $2,200 
dowry by paying half up front and agreeing to house his parents-in-law for the 
remainder of their lives. For youth unwilling or unable to make such sacri-
fices, dowry can be a financial requirement that makes marriage inaccessible. 
This egregiously high cost is negotiated between parties and is not included 
in many analysts’ calculation of “marriage costs,” even though dowry prices 
dramatically affect a young man’s ability to put together the money needed 
for a marriage. Thus, the above statistics on the high cost of marriage are 
actually hiding part of the skyrocketing price—in addition to the rising cost 
of marriage, the rising cost of dowry makes becoming an adult a very costly 
enterprise. While a number of countries are experiencing similar rising costs 
of marriage—China and India are the most notable examples—the Arab 
world has experienced even more dramatic and exaggerated price increases. 
The nature of dowry in Arab culture has combined with changing defini-
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tions of who is an acceptable spouse, leading to the replacement of social 
ties with economic ties that cannot be easily borne. 
A Connected Concern: The Arab Housing Crisis 
One of the most frustrating challenges for youth preparing for marriage is 
the rising cost of housing. In the Arab world, the groom is usually expected 
to purchase the couple’s first home at the time of the wedding, or put down 
a significant amount of money 
toward a long-term apartment 
rental. In Egypt, housing costs 
contribute a third of wedding 
costs (another third going toward 
furniture to fill the new home) 
(Singerman 2007). For previous 
generations, living in extended families under one roof was a normal part of 
the life course, particularly in the urban environment. Youth, however, have 
been raised on television and internet images from both the West and media 
powerhouses like Egypt and Turkey that portray the lives of singles and pre-
parenthood couples in a different way. These new images show youth living 
on their own in urban apartments within the same neighborhood or city as 
their parents, able to experience the independence of living alone while still 
having close access to their parents’ home and the security of the extended 
family. This ideal is the goal of many young couples, and as a result, the 
cost of “starter” homes and apartments is calculated into marriage costs. 
Increases in housing costs and unavailability of suitable housing both delay 
the marriage process for youth. The inability to find suitable housing also 
delays the formation of adult identities for youth, as they fail to create their 
own adult homes. According to the 2010/2011 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 
Arab Youth Survey, unemployment and the rising cost of living—including 
housing—are the top concerns for young Arabs. 
The Arab world is experiencing a minor housing crisis, brought on by 
a combination of misdirected development projects and misguided rent 
control. In most urban centers across the Arab world, affordable housing is 
a rarity, but according to the World Bank, “the affordability problem does 
not appear to be driven by scarcity as a whole, but it is more likely that 
The Arab world is experiencing a minor 
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scarcity exists in certain segments of the housing market (e.g. low-income 
housing)” (World Bank 2005:10). While foreign (particularly Emirati and 
Saudi) investment has allowed for a number of new housing projects across 
the Arab world, these modern gated communities are oriented toward the 
upper-class and foreign clientele, resulting in an over-supply of high-cost 
housing. Little of the growing production of housing has been oriented 
toward the lower end of the housing market. Yet youth are rarely interested 
in purchasing an upper-class condo or house as their first home, particularly 
when they do not yet have the children to fill it.
Rent control, which discourages private sector housing development, 
is exacerbating these problems. Most Arab states practice some form of 
government-mandated “second-generation” rent control, under which 
landlords can only set rents at the beginning of the lease period and govern-
mental indexes determine the small increases in rent allowed (World Bank 
2005). This kind of rent control rewards current renters, but punishes new 
renters by forcing landlords to set high initial rents and deterring landlords 
from engaging in formal leasing. Rent control is coupled in most Arab states 
with strict rental laws that heavily favor the renter, making it difficult to 
expel bad tenants. Landlords in the private sector thus have little motivation 
to take on new tenants, improve or maintain units, or create formal rental 
contracts. This all but destroys the formal rental market, which would be 
the most desirable market for single youths and young couples because of 
the security provided by legal rental agreements.
The result is that housing prices across the board have risen in the past 
decade, and there has been an increase in informal housing. This may 
include: housing not currently meeting government standards; apartments 
rented through informal and non-contractual agreements; the “renting” of 
family-owned assets to distant relatives moving into new urban settings; 
and, in extreme circumstances, the creation of slums. This informal market 
offers little security in the short or long term to youth, particularly those 
who move from rural to urban environments looking for work. Youth have 
few options for lower-class housing as many viable apartment options are 
deliberately left vacant by landlords disinterested in entering a poor formal 
housing market, and starting rents are either egregiously high or found in 
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the informal sector where renters have no security or legal recourse (Middle 
East Youth Initiative 2009). The long-term cultural implications ultimately 
revolve around changing ideas of personal autonomy, with a youth genera-
tion looking to “strike out on their own” while the economic realities of 
their countries do not allow them to find housing and thus embrace the 
cultural change they are seeking. The nexus of sexual desire, pious aspira-
tions, individual morality and responsibility, and societal emphasis on 
family formation as a requirement of adulthood is already a difficult terrain 
for youth to traverse. Frustration thus occurs when youth are forced to delay 
culmination of this phase of the life course because of a financial calculus 
at the national and international level that does not provide them with the 
opportunities necessary to make a savable wage.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS:  
CULTURAL CHANGE, FRUSTRATION, AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION
The problems and trends discussed here should be the subject of study for 
business leaders, policymakers, political authorities, and academics alike 
interested in the cultural foundations of youth discontent in the Arab 
world; more empirical research is needed to determine the nature of these 
challenges in each country’s unique circumstances. However, conclusions 
about the cultural impacts of ensnarement in the pre-adulthood phase can 
be explored within the context of the Arab Spring and applied to subse-
quent political efforts within each state to address the concerns presented by 
angry youth. 
Impacts of the Failure of Attaining Adulthood
Youth in the Arab world are simultaneously trapped by the physical and 
structural realities of poor education, unemployment, and failure of family 
formation, as well as by the cultural realities of societies quick to judge—
even as these societies are themselves in transition and grappling with 
economic and political woes. Youth are struggling to create a coherent and 
unique sense of identity, while experiencing symbolic rejection (Bennani-
Chraibi 2000; Singerman 2007) from their societies. The Islamic revival 
which inspired the Arab world since the mid-1970s brought with it rhetoric 
regarding living life as a “good Muslim citizen,” a discourse which included 
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validation of the role of good mother or father and good spouse, as well as 
a good citizen contributing to an economically successful state. In addition, 
for many, “good Muslims” have the financial ability to donate zakat (similar 
to the concept of alms) to the poor of the community; zakat, as one of the 
pillars of Islam, is a required cost of living piously. For others, “good Mus-
lims” aspire to another of the pillars of Islam: taking the hajj, or pilgrimage 
to Mecca, a requirement only if one can afford it.
Many Arab youth, though they do not view themselves as Islamist, conser-
vative, or extremely religious, want to live pious lives in accordance with 
Islamic values, which for them will mean becoming a good Islamic citizen 
even while living in secular states. These youth, unable to financially sup-
port families of their own, are neither able to fulfill their religious obliga-
tion to be functioning adults in Islamic society, nor can they experience 
what they perceive as the joy of 
parenthood within the confines 
of their religion and religious 
community. Muslims who spend 
their entire lives paying loans for 
lavish weddings may struggle to 
fund their trip for the hajj later 
in life. Youth may struggle to 
contribute zakat to their community, losing the opportunity to gain social 
status and the associational ties that can be made by working with Islamic 
charities. In addition to being emotionally frustrating, this delay also means 
that youth are stuck in a state of religious pre-adulthood, unable to take on 
adult responsibilities at the mosque or in religious associations. Youth who 
feel unable to meet their religious obligations to their community because of 
delayed adulthood may express an understandable resentment toward their 
governments and societies.
Resentment of the family and frustration with familial authority structures 
are both a cause and a consequence of the frustration youth feel toward their 
failed transition to adulthood. The family unit is the foundation of the organi-
zation of Arab societies, and strong family values are combined with a genuine 
sense of wanting to maintain meaningful bonds in the family. Arab youth are 
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increasingly drawn to more liberal ideas of personal autonomy, and many are 
torn between the desire to uphold the traditional value of familial cohesive-
ness, or strike out on their own both physically and psychologically. Still, 
according to the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, Arab youth 
believe that parents and family continue to be the most influential forces in 
their outlook on the world (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2011). While some 
Arab youth are toying with new outlooks on what adulthood should “mean” 
in terms of personal space and property, others prefer the idea of years of 
family support before marriage. In both cases, however, the pivotal issue is 
choice: choosing to participate in the traditional family unit, and/or choosing 
to pursue a more individualistic worldview focusing on independence and the 
self. The economic constraints, particularly on marriage, remove the element 
of choice and leave youth of all persuasions reliant on their parents and family. 
These youth are unable to become adult members of the family and, as 
“children” well into their 20s and 30s, grow resentful that the construc-
tion of their own identities is stalled in relation to their parents, siblings, 
and peers. The result is that “the socioeconomic functions of the family—
prolonged financial support, a social network and other benefits of close-
ness—although diminished by the increased importance of the state and 
the modernization of the economy, have been revived. The construction of 
the subject has progressed far enough for any dependence to be a source of 
resentment” (Bennani-Chraibi 2000:147). Families of young grooms will 
spend their entire family savings to marry off a son, while other families 
struggle financially for years to pay for the private tutoring necessary for 
children to obtain the university diplomas that fail to ensure better employ-
ment prospects (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; World Bank/IBRD 2008). 
Simultaneously, youth living in their parents’ homes are subject to their 
rules regarding dress, spending habits, and socializing with peers, which can 
lead to an animosity that only grows worse as the youth ages but does not 
progress toward adulthood. Living with one’s parents, in the Arab world as 
with elsewhere, comes with some strings attached.
Resentment and the Arab Spring
As 2011 and 2012 proceeded, romantic notions of pan-Arab unity and 
democratization heralded by eager participants dissolved when it became 
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clear that little actual change would occur in the region. The momentum of 
a bloodless dismissal of Tunisia’s Ben Ali led to a military coup and Islamist 
takeover in Egypt that was all but barely clothed in the appearance of popu-
lar revolution. The Moroccan revolution was easily co-opted by a well-loved 
king. These three cases turned out to be the “successes,” though in all three 
countries, Islamists quickly and 
easily filled the vacuums of power 
made available. But the Arab 
Spring melted into a summer of 
discontent as Libyan rebels and 
pro-Gaddafi forces battled under 
the shadows of NATO aircraft 
and Yemen’s already weak state 
fell into violence and chaos. Saudi 
Arabia rolled tanks into Bahrain 
to stop protests there in a Wah-
habi counterrevolution against 
growing Shi’i interests, quashing 
any rumors of a pan-Arab sentiment. The Kuwaiti government wrote direct 
checks to citizens and awarded Kuwaitis with 14 months of free food (Arab 
News 2011), which many Kuwaitis viewed as a bribe to delay protests. Jordan, 
which has largely remained quiet under the moderate hand of King Abdullah, 
faced its largest demonstrations to date in October of 2012. Even as this paper 
goes to print, the international community is struggling to agree on a response 
to Syrian violence perpetrated by the government against its own people. 
Many of the youth involved in the protests and demonstrations of the 
Arab Spring feel that their governments have not provided them with the 
opportunities they deserve. Their patriotism and nationalism have left 
many feeling betrayed and that their loyalty has not been rewarded. Most 
lack any forum in which to work on these social and economic issues with 
the government, leaving youth feeling politically excluded and ignored. 
For many youth in the Arab world, the Arab Spring was a call to govern-
ments to provide opportunity, and allow youth to become adults; if these 
youth are not given the social, political, and economic space to become 
adults, they will seek a way to end their pre-adulthood liminal phase on 
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their own, even if that means becoming militant or participating in mas-
sive peaceful demonstrations.
Angry and with little else to do, many unemployed, highly educated and single 
youth turn to peaceful protest—or worse, to militancy—and represent a legiti-
mate threat to the security of Arab regimes. After all, in Tunisia “of the 700,000 
officially reckoned to be jobless in a population of 10.6m, some 170,000 are 
graduates—the angriest part of a populace enraged by the inequities and cor-
ruption that helped spark the revolution against Mr. Ben Ali” (Economist 2011). 
Youth in Tahrir Square did not have to fear losing their jobs or homes by spend-
ing days camped out at the protests; restless and empty-handed, these youth had 
no jobs to be absent from, and no young spouses or houses of their own to go 
home to. Trapped in a liminal phase of pre-adulthood, youth blame the regimes 
that have placed too many roadblocks in their paths to maturity and societal 
acceptance. Ultimately, the Arab Spring was a political manifestation of cultural 
frustration for many Arab youth.
Resentment of the Arab Spring
But a final cultural issue may be worth noting here: youth frustration will 
not only be a cause of the Arab Spring, but also a consequence of it. In 
Egypt, a final-round vote between a former Mubarak crony and a Muslim 
Brotherhood leader came days after riots in Tahrir Square over the acquit-
tal of Gamal Mubarak of crimes against protestors. Everyday Egyptians are 
only beginning to come to terms with the truth of their 2011: the protests 
in Tahrir Square ended one State of Emergency only to usher in a new one. 
Moroccans have begun new demonstrations in Casablanca, now frustrated 
that the Islamist government elected after the king’s reforms has not yet 
lived up to campaign promises. Libyans, after slaying Gaddafi, live in a ten-
tative state precariously balanced between hopeful democrats and transna-
tional mujahideen with enough power to murder an American ambassador. 
And though the final shape of Syria is yet to be known, 2012 will likely 
be remembered as the darkest time of Syrians’ lives. At its worst, “the Arab 
Spring has been a dismal failure. All indications are that what comes next 
will be significantly worse than what existed before, in Tunisia and every-
where else, and the traumatic events up to now have already caused untold 
havoc and violence and made the lives of innocent ordinary people even 
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more miserable than they already 
were. Socially and economically, 
the Arab Spring has put back 
countries like Tunisia, Yemen, 
and Syria by decades” (Bradley 
2012:215).
The causes of the Arab Spring 
were far broader and more culturally, politically, and economically ingrained 
in the lives of Arab youth than one leader or figurehead. Ousting the leader 
will only temporarily lessen tensions; far more significant will be the real 
changes in the state apparatuses and governmental structures of Arab states, in 
terms of privatization of certain industries, the opening of the private sector, 
reorganization and implementation of new educational policy, job creation, 
housing market control, and democratic progress. Youth who successfully win 
the right to free and fair elections, but still cannot earn a living or start a fam-
ily, will not be satisfied with the long-term results of the Arab Spring. 
But this is not the first time that the Arab world has experienced revolu-
tions, nor will it be the last. Youth in the Arab world have often found 
cultural identity within the socio-political movements of their times. For 
a generation of Arabs, Nasser and the pan-Arabism he fathered became 
cultural touchstones. Many Moroccans proudly self-identify with the ideals 
of the Green March of 1975, while Lebanese had their own understand-
ings of both their national and religious identities rewritten that same year 
with the beginning of the Lebanese civil war. Neighboring non-Arab states 
have had similar experiences; an entire generation of Iranians connect their 
identity to that of the 1979 Revolution, depending on which side one allied 
himself. Young Iranians, no longer lulled by the siren’s song of a 30-year-old 
broken promise, sought to create their own revolutionary identity in 2009, 
only to be stalled in the process by the aging regime. For many Arab youth, 
the revolutions of 2011 will become the defining event of their early lives, 
particularly for the unemployed and single youth for whom any other form 
of adulthood-affirmation is missing or delayed. 
Which leads to the question no one wants to ask: what will happen if the 
promise of the Arab Spring is a lie? Though I am optimistic about the role 
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of Islamists in shaping a liberal, pious future for the Arab world, there are 
many in the region who are more doubtful of the truth behind moderate 
Islamist politics in North Africa. There is more violence in the region, as 
well as more economic instability, but these sacrifices have not been met 
with significant restructuring of government apparatuses or economic 
policy. Even those youth who put their lives on the line in Tahrir Square 
and Benghazi may not be able to hold back the waves of youth frustration 
as each subsequent revolution fails to bring the opportunity or hope that is 
promised. How many “days of rage” are required for Arab youth to qualify 
as a lost generation?
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE ARAB FUTURE
Improving the youth situation in the Arab world is necessary for global and 
regional stability. The financial costs of massive youth unemployment in 
the region have been well-documented (Chaaban 2008; e4e 2011); Arab 
nations will continue to lose potential GDP in the future if they fail to use 
a large and eager segment of their employable workforce. The political costs 
are also extremely high: educated, single, and empty-handed, Arab youth 
have little to lose and a lot to demand. Without outlets for participating in 
the political process, these youth have taken to the streets across the Arab 
world to overthrow their countries’ regimes, or to at least demand signifi-
cant reorganization of their governments. 
Even if economic reform eases current tensions, the feeling of being trapped 
in a pre-adulthood phase has alienated a number of Arab youth and will have 
longer-term implications for the current youth cohort’s sense of dignity and 
identity. Those who feel trapped in childhood status in regard to their fami-
lies, especially when unable to move out of the home, may experience strained 
familial relations, a societal concern in an Arab world where the family is para-
mount. A “brain-drain,” in which the best and brightest minds leave the Arab 
world because of a perceived lack of opportunity, is also a potential long-term 
negative effect. Rising rates of premarital sex often correlate to increases in the 
prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases and unplanned pregnancies, both 
of which still carry extreme social stigma in the Arab world. The inability of 
youth to afford low-income housing will also lead to the rise of slums, which 
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come with their own set of socio-economic challenges. All of these potential 
problems stem from the fundamental failure of the governments and even 
societies of the Arab world to provide youth with the opportunities neces-
sary to develop a sense of dignity and identity while building adult lives and 
achieving adult social status for themselves.
Many of the problems discussed above, such as significant youth demo-
graphic bulges or the rising costs of marriage, are not unique to the Arab 
world, but they are relevant 
today for two main reasons. 
First, the combination of these 
factors—a youth bulge, massive 
youth unemployment, increasing 
quantity but decreasing qual-
ity of education, large numbers 
of unemployed degree-holders, 
delayed marriage, and housing 
access concerns—translates into 
a massive societal problem not seen to this extreme elsewhere. Nowhere else 
in the world do youth have such a difficult time becoming adults, and only 
in the Arab world is the alienation of youth so powerful along every possible 
avenue of adulthood-attainment. Second, these problems became of central 
relevance to the world when demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere 
would not leave the streets until they experienced change. These problems 
are of such importance to the lives of Arab youth that, tired of waiting on 
their government’s inability or unwillingness to offer real opportunity, they 
have demanded their place in the world through protest and regime change. 
Governments, Arab and Western, need to accept that these youth will 
continue to protest and express frustration if their needs are not met, and 
it would not be surprising to see echoes of the Arab Spring in subsequent 
demonstrations in the short- and medium-term future. The broken promise 
of adulthood can no longer be ignored—the youth of Cairo, Tunis, Tripoli, 
and throughout the Arab world have grown tired of waiting for adult status. 
As their numbers continue to grow, they will constitute a force of great 
potential change in the world.
These problems are of such impor-
tance to the lives of Arab youth that, 
tired of waiting on their government’s 
inability or unwillingness to o!er real 
opportunity, they have demanded their 
place in the world through protest and 
regime change.
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